Just the Way They Like It

The True Story of the Bilderberg Group, Daniel Estulin, TrineDay, 2007.  340pp. , index, endnotes.

In conspiracy theory circles the Bilderberg Group is always an object of much discussion.  Founded in 1954 by Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, the group has met annually ever since.  The meetings are always held in a five star hotel in a small city of the main road.  Security is extreme.  On film I saw on YouTube said the group always meets in “five star accommodations amid ten star security.”  The meeting are private; attendance is by invitation only.  The location is revealed only a week before the meeting.  The meeting gets very little coverage in the mainstream media.

Estulin states that his purpose is to “tear the mask off the Bilderberg group.”  He succeeds somewhat, but, even as he admits, there is still much to learn.  The Bilderbergers do everything in their power to keep it that way.  Estulin points out that there is never an  official statement issued, discussions and presentations are not recorded or transcribed, and note taking by participants, while not forbidden, is discouraged.  The code of silence is honored.

Much of what Estulin writes is available from  other sources (e.g., YouTube, where there is a lot of video).  But the book does give us a summary of the discussions of the 2005, 2006, and 2007 meetings.  There are copious photographs of the attendees, some documents reproduced, and lists of the participants.

Estulin’s sources are the real issue.  It is the nature of the matter that verification is difficult.  How do we check behind Estulin?  How do we check behind anyone who writes about such groups?  There would be no conspiracy if this were all done in the open.

But this leads to the question, “Why is this done in secrecy?”  The official answer from the group is to allow the participants to speak freely without fear of attribution.  Estulin asks why can’t we know what the attendees say; they all are leader of giant corporation, principal journalists, government officials, and university administrators; people who all affect our lives.

Estulin’s book is not just limited to discussion of the Bilderberg Group.  He spends considerable time discussing the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral commission.  Both of these groups are prominent in conspiracy theory.  Here too he does not reveal anything that is not already known by those who are interested in finding out, but for those who are just beginning to look into this matter it will be helpful.

Estulin spends several chapters discussing his intrigues in tracking the conspiracy.  He relates how he was detained for questioning by airport security.  Nothing came of it when he insisted that they either charge him with a crime or let him go.  He was released.  In another chapter, he tells of getting a cryptic postcard that lead him  to a meeting with a acquaintance of poor repute.  Suspicious of the matter Estulin retains his own security force of ex KGB agents.  They arm him with a pistol, apparently not concerned with any violation of local gun laws.  The meeting never takes place. Another intrigue is his almost walking into an empty elevator shaft after meeting with a contact.

The book is filled with photographs of attendees during breaks in the sessions.  While interesting, most of the 51 pages of photograph are collages of attendees talking to each other as they stroll about the grounds between sessions.  There is even a photo of David Rockefeller eating alone.

This book will be most useful to those beginning to sort through the various groups that meet in private.  Whether or not the Bilderberg group is a cabal will be denied by the group.  Until the group is examined by the mainstream media (unlikely, since the major media owners are often in attendance) the discussion of the group will remain entirely within conspiracy theory circles.  This is just the way the Bilderbergers like it.

The Average Thoughts Averaged to Be Correct

The Wisdom of Crowds, James Surowiecke.  Doubleday, New York, 2004.  296pp., end notes, no index.

In contrast to what is thought to be the case, the collective intelligence of the group is lower than the sum of the members, Surowiecke argues that the group is actually smarter than the individual members.  He cites the group’s estimation of the dressed weight of a slaughtered ox in an experiment run by Francis Galton at a fair in England.  The group, largely non-expert average fair goers, gave an estimate that was off by one pound from the actual weight.  No one guess of the more than 800 estimates submitted was that close.  But when the guesses were averaged the result was amazingly accurate.

In more recent times the same type of experiment was conducted in a college class room using a jar of jelly beans.  Once again the average of the guesses was more accurate than any single guess.  Other examples, these from the real world, would be the stock market reaction to the space shuttle Challenger disaster and, oddly, the finding of the wreckage of the lost U.S. Navy submarine Scorpion in the Atlantic Ocean.

The way this works deal with group dynamics and the way individuals think.  To be effective, the individuals in the group must be independent of each other, a diverse lot, and each possess a different set of what Surowiecki calls, “private knowledge.”

The author survey the literature in the field of the social sciences to glean insights into the ways groups from committees to juries form opinions and conclusions.  It is when the principles are violated or are absent that the groups are subject to the herd mentality.  This, Surowiecki says, explains fads and bubbles.

In this age of the expert, yet the experts are usually wrong.  We tend to lean to their advice because of the technological nature of our modern lives.  But the experts never agree with each other; opinions are in perpetual conflict.  The distrust of experts in not new; Surowiecki cites Thomas Jefferson in preferring the opinion of a plowman to that of a professor on moral issues.

This is such to give us pause that the opinions of the elite in government and industry are not as brilliant as we are given to believe.  In fact, if we look at the evidence, when the elite get it right, it is often the case of pure luck.

A more realistic view of the professional managers would be to look to the space shuttle Columbia disaster.  Here the managers on the ground thought they had a problem with the heat shield on the shuttle when on take off the tiles were struck by a piece of foam that had fallen off the fuel tank.

In the meeting to discuss the problem, there was no dissent by any of the members of the committees.  This is largely due to the homogeneous nature of the members: they were all veteran NASA employees that came to the agency directly from college.  They were all working with the exact same information and with the same presuppositions.  The exchange of ideas was discouraged,  and the group leader expressed the idea that nothing could be done anyway.  No new information was sought.  It turns out that NASA did not even know the extent of the damage.  So nothing was done.

When done correctly, the average of the group can do very well, better than any expert.  When done the way it is usually done, the result is a burst bubble, or a destroyed shuttle and dead crew.

The book is worth the effort to read.  The writing is passable in the most part, a bit dry in others. The end notes an abomination.  First they are end notes.  But worse of all there is no note reference on the pages of the text.  One must get the idea that there is a note from the quotation marks.  I hope this was a decision by an expert.